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An agricultural transition when demand is constrained is more
difficult to manage than when the fruits of institutional change
and productivity grow\th  find ready outlets. Any progress on the
demanid side-  b  increasing domestic demand or improving
perfonnance in export markets - will give a major impetus to
the institutional chanrws needed on the splnplv  side.
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useful  comments  on an earlier  draft.DECOLLECTIVIZATION
AND THIE  AGRICULTURAL  TRANSITION
IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE
The agricultural transition is approximately  a year and a half old, if we date i.s
start from the Polish big bang of January, 1990.  Like many a recalcitrant toddler, it
refuses to behave as expected.
A properly behaved  agricultural transition  is a cornerstone  of the framework  of
stabilization  and structural adjustment  in East/Central Europe. The agricultural "supply
response" should  be an early bright spot in an otherwise  bleak picture of slow and costly
industrial  restructuring  and deteriorating  real incomes. Man may not live by bread alone,
but more bread is very welcome when there is less of so much else.  The supply
response is to result from better incentives  for producers of food, achieved largely by
giving them ownership  of land. The distribution  of agricultural  land is viewed as simple
compared to the complexity  of industrial privatization and restructuring.  Once rural
people have possession  of their land, they are to welcome their unemployed  relatives
dismissed from defunct factories.
Agriculture  is thus expected  to defy the laws of gravity that  pull down production
in other sectors.  It is to absorb unemployment  while contributing  to an improved trade
balance. These feats are to be accomplished  largely on the strength of the land reform,
and the improved efficiency that new land ownership brings.  The foreign community
assists this process by encouraging the land reform, lending to the "emerging  private
sector," providing newly private farmers appropriate machinery and access to better
processing, and offering  temporary food aid.
Tnis is the agricultural transition that many people expect, but it is not the one
that we have.  Rural people produce less, rather than more food, and have increasing-2-
difficulty selling their products.  The land reform does not produce many individual
private farmers, because few individual  farmers can survive the harsh economic  realities
of the early transition.  Consumers  would like to have more food, but cannot afford to
buy what is  available.  Donated food aid  sits in  warehouses unless it  is  priced
significantly  lower than international  trading pnces, raising uncomtortable  questions of
fair trade practices.
These are not the attributes  of a conventionally  well behaved transition, but they
are fully  consistent  with the economic  logic underlying  the process. The supply  response
needed throughout East/Central European agriculture is a  contraction coupled with
restructuring to increase efficiency.  Both within and outside the country the need for
greater efficiency is recognized, and the resources of the donor community  are targeted
toward this goal.  Recognition  of the needed contraction  has been slow to come, yet its
logic is inescapable. Domestic  average disposition  of food in each of the countries has
been close to that of Western Europe, although real incomes are much lower.  Price
liberalization raises  the  relative  price  of  food  and  reduces  domestic  demand.
Intraregional trade  in  food  has collapsed, and  access to  world  markets is  poor.
Traditional  collectivized  agriculture  was enticed  into capital  intensive  production  practices
by negative real interest  rates.  The combination of d3e.C1ininr  dnmestir  dpmind,  ndnor
export  prospects, positive  real interest rates, and discriminatory  partial price liberalization
overwhelms any positive response that might come from land reform.  The contraction
is in progress, and in some places it is severe.
Throughout  the region the agricultural transition has brought excess supply for
food at the current price and income structure. The domestic policy community  has had
so little past experience with excess supply that the problem is not properly recognized;how can there be excess supply when production  is falling, producers want to sell, and
consumers  want to buy?  Foreign observers looking for a repeat of China's experience
are sirnilarly  blinkered. Attention  focuses  on subsidiary  problems; e.g., incomplete  price
liberalization, continued monopoly in processing and marketing, and closed export
markets.
These exacerbate, but do not create the fundamental  problem.  Centrally  planned
economies  channeled  an inordinate  proportion of resources into food production. In a
perverse economic triumph they managed, despite inefficiency, to deliver a better diet
than consumers could afford in the long run, or would choose to buy at unsubsidized
prices.
In the medium  and longer term domestic  demand for food will recover along with
the economy more generally, but economic growth will have to be quite substantial
before domestic consumers  buy the amount of food they formerly bought at subsidized
prices. If the Soviet economy  turns around, the USSR  can resume its position as a major
buver of East/Central European food.  Both the Middle East and Western Europe are
potential  customers  for East/Central  European food, depending  on economic  growth and
trade restrictions. Significant  progress in libmalization  of agricultural  trade and reduction
of  policy-induced surpluses in  world  trade  would  improve  export  markets  for
East/Central European products.  With favorable developments in export markets the
traditional  supply response; i.e.,  more food produced more efficiently, would be good
for the sector and the economies  as a whole.  At present, however, both domestic and
export markets are depressed,  and will remain so throughout much of the transition.
TIhe  contraction  is already underway, particularly in the livestock sector, and it
is very painful for rural people, especially the fully exposed newly private farmers.-4  -
Prior to price liberalization,  the lack of economic  infrastructure  supportive  of small scale
private farming was enough to keep all but a  few producers within the cooperative
(Brooks 1990).  Now that the contraction  has begun, life as an independent  producer is
even grimmer. Private producers  report that they cannot  sell their animals  because with
declining demand processcrs can get adequate quantities from the cooperatives.  As
interest rates rise demand for agricultural credit has fallen.  This factual statement
inadequately  conveys  agricultural producers' astonishment  and apprehension as they
observe  the impact  of decontrolled  interest rates on the capital  intensive  farming practices
they  were encouraged  to adopt in the past. The cooperatives  have inherited  capital  assets
and a potential to grow theIr own animal feed, and are thus better able to wait out
transitory spikes in nominal interest rates.  Most private producers do not have that
capacity.
In the current economic  stress, an agricultural  sector is emerging in the formerly
collectivized  countries that is private in name, but largely collective in fact.  Genuine
private producers will be  squeezed out by  the economically stronger cooperatives.
Households  wiU  receive their land rights, and sign them over to managers  of voluntary
"privateH  producers' cooperatives. These cooperatives  will be private in the sense that
they will be required to pay dividends  to their owners  and will operate without automatic
state subsidy. They will nonetheless  have the conflicts  between collective  and individual
incentives that have impeded the competitiveness  and long term economic viability of
agricultural  producer cooperatives  throughout  the world.
These cooperatives, maoreover,  will not represent a clear enough break with the
institutions of  the  past to  bring new behavior.  The problem is  not primarily that
retrograde managers  will cling to their nowers  and thwart the independence  of members;. 5  -
many managers are skilled and conscientious  and welcome the new order.  The greater
problem is that new managers  will end up acting much like the old; assigning workers,
counting hours, and cross-subsidizing  activities.  The new cooperatives will resemble
collective farms of East/Central Europe in the early period after collectivization,  when
they were relatively  small, still paid rent for land, and had a greater degree of managerial
autonomy  and financial  independence  than they retained later.
These may  be the necessary  institutions  of the transition; forced decollectivization
should not be pushed on rural people.  The new producers' cooperatives  are surely not
the foundation of a  competitive  market oriented agriculture in  the future.  As new
producers' cooperatives  appear  through  the land  distribution, many  observers both within
and outside the countries mistake  them for the private voluntary marketing  cooperatives
that have served agriculture well in  many economic settings.  As long as the new
cooperatives  have major activities  in agricultural  production, they should  not be grouped
with that loose agglomeration  of firms  called "the emerging  private sector." They should
be sympathetically  recognized  for what they are, "the receding  collective  sector."  Their
divestiture of  collective production and  transformation into  marketing and  service
cooperatives  should be assisted.
Many rurai  households in  East/Centrai burope  throughout the  socialist era
retained formal property rights to their land, even though these rights were meaningless.
Reconstructing  and redistributing  those  rights at great cost will be a tragic-comic  exercise
in futility if rational producers have little choice but voluntarily to sign them over to the
cooperatives  again, and those cooperatives  do not speedily deconstruct into genuinely
priv:te farms.  One is reminded of the vodka trucks that used to follow the paymaster
in Soviet factory towns to collect and recycle the cash on payday.  If the intemational-6-
community fails clearly to  understand the new cooperatmves  and  their role in  the
transition,  donated and borrowed dollars will fuel the recycling  of property rights.
It is in this atmosphere  of Rcute  economic  uncertainty  and declining  farm incomes
that the distribution of agricultural land is  proceeding.  Romania leads with swift
implementation  of a land law passed in February, 1991. Many owners expect to take
possession  of their land after the harvest in fall of 1991, although few will thereafter
farm individually.  The Bulgarian land law was also passed in February of 1991, but
implementation  has been delayed  and the approach  taken implies  a more lengthy  process.
Land laws in Hungary  and Czechoslovakia  were passed in April and May, respectively,
of 1991.
The following  paragraphs trace the progress of liberalization  of food prices and
distribution  of agricultural  land to date.  A detailed exposition  of the general framework
for the agricultural transition  describes the context in which price liberalization  and the
distribution  of land can be understood.  Many readers would undoubtedly  prefer to go
directly to the main issues without  the more general view.  Land is, after all, the central
agricultural resource, and one should be able to discuss changes in land tenure and in
price policy without reviewing  the agricultural transition  in its entirety.
IT 1991 in East'Central Europe, however, changes  i-a Iand  tejijire  d uscanno
be properly understood  out of context.  The essence of the agricultural transition is the
state's withdrawal  from its traditional  role as residual claimant  of (positive  and negative)
rents to use of agricultural  resources.  That role will pass in stages to owners of land,
where it ordinarily resides in a ma7ket  economy. A discussion  of the new land laws and
distribution  of land would  be incomprehensible  without  attention  to conditions  that shape
the value of land and the income that owners can earn from it.A FRAMEWORK FOR TIIE AGRICULTURAL  TRANSITION'
Initial Condtions at the Outset of the Transition
The countries of Eastern and Central Europe comprise a  large and diverse
agricultural  region even if the Soviet Union is excluded. In the northern tier, in Poland,
the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, and the former GDR grains (except for maize),
roots, and specialty crops dominate the field crops, and imports augment domestic
production of feed to sustain a large livestock industry. In Hungary, Romania, and
northern Yugoslavia moisture and warmth are adequate for maize ard  oilseeds, and
mixed grain/livestock farming predominates.  Farther south in Yugoslavia  and Bulgaria
irrigation  becomes  more important, as do viticulture,  orchards, and tobacco  production.
If the Soviet Union  is included, the agroclimatic  range of Eastern and Central Europe is
replicated, and augmented by the largest area of irrigated agriculture in the world, in
Soviet Central Asia.
The countries of the region operated under a common  ideology in the past, but
within bounds  set by that ideology,  exhibited  significant  differences  in agricultural  policv
and farm organization. The greatest  difference  is between those  that collectivized  (GDR,
Czechoslovakia,  Hungary, Romania,  Bulgaria,  Albania,  the USSR)  and those  that did not
(Po  IvnA, Yugoslavia). Each faces  a  unique set ot  tasks and constraints during  the
transition. In order to draw lessons that transcend the particularities  of the individual
countries, we create in the following  paragraphs a stylized country with the general
fea ures of each, but the particular uniqueness  of none. We take the stylized country
I  This  section draws on material in Brooks  et al., JEP, 1991.-8
through  an agricultural  transition, indicating  how the initial conditions  affect tlhe  path of
transition.
Agricultural  production  in the stylized  country was collectivized. Approximately
one third of farms were state farms, and two thirds were collective  farms (cooperatives),
but there was in practice little diff.ence  between the two. State farms specialized  in
agricultural production. On these farrms,  workers were salaried employees  of the state,
and the state owned all farm assets, including much of the land. Collective  farms were
also large, and had  diversified  processing  and sideline  activities  in addition  to agricultural
production. Many members of collective farms in theory retained title to collectively
managed  land, but ownership  rights in the past were so attenuated  as to be meaningless.
For various reasons, some private owners deeded their land to the collective.  Lands
managed  by the collective  farms were thus owned by individuals  and by the collective,
but rarely by the state.  The exception  to this pattern is the USSR, whure all l;.nd was
nationalized. On both side and collective  farms, workers had a high degree of job and
wage security, little responsibility  for the financial  performance of the farm, and little
incentive  to improve productivity.  Both farms were protected  from bankruptcy  by a soft
budget  constraint.
raLill clspluyuzc  iliuag,it  d  lhuubuhuid  piuL ul  dUUUL uLC naif hecLare  in addiuon
to their work on the large farm. Ln  this small area they used inputs provided or purchased
from the large farm plus famil  .abor to produce food for their own use or for the
market. The structure of production was thus dual, with very large units of 2,000 and
3,000 hectares plus many mini-farms of one half hectare. The private and socialist
sectors were intimately  linked in one agricultural system, and interacted symbiotically.
Each would have faced significantly higher costs of production if forced to function- 9 -
independently  of  the other. The large farms contracted out some of  the more labor
intensive tasks, such as caring for very young animnals,  to  the mini-farms. Private
producers, in turn, depended on the large farms for inputs and services not available
elsewhere since markets for them did not exist.
This dual structure  and the constrailits  on private landholding  that produced  it had
the greatest impact on the livestock sector.  The highest value that many households
could receive from their tiny plots was in livestock products, but they could not grow
feed on a half hectare.  The large farms rarely had the flexibility  or incentive to make
high quality  pasture available  f . pr vate use, and the livestock  sector, both collective  and
private, became dependent  on concentrate  feed.  Private animals tethered for grazing on
highway  rights-of-way  and even median strips  .in full view of poorly tended collective
pastures provided vivid testimony of the constraints on management  of the livestock
sector.
Agriculture employed  25 percent of the work force, and produced  20 percent of
GNP. In developed market economies,  agriculture is capital intensive and the share of
agriculture in the labor force is smaller than its contribution to GNP. In our stylized
country, capital investment in agricultural production has also been substantial.  This
inv,estment  w  in p-t  niecessitated  by the political decision to replace small scale private
agriculture by  large  scale collective agriculture, with  the  resulting need for  land
reclamation, large buildings, and large machines. In part the investment implemented
the pursuit of higher output and increased  domestic  self sufficiency  in food.  Rarely was
investment  guided by calculus of economic  returns.
A° a consequence  the high rates of investment  did not release as much labor as
in market economies.  Accumulated  investment  per unit land was quite high, sfthough- 10-
high rates of depreciation  of buildings  and machinery  reduced the value of the physical
capital stock.  The retained labor force in agriculture was higher still, and ratios of
capital per worker were lower than in Western Europe and North America where the
natural endowment  resembles that of East/Central Europe.
In  this  curious defiance of  conventional economic measures,  East/Central
European agriculture was and is  both capital and  labor intensive.  The point has
important  implications  for investment  policy during the transition. In countries that lag
in  restructuring state and collective farms (the USSR and perhaps Czechoslovakia)
budgetary inertia buttressed by powerf"l agricultural lobbies can continue to channel
large amounts of money into land reclamation, large buildings, and large machines of
dubious long term value.  If the new cooperatives  of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria
are mistaken for private firms and offered subsidized  credit, the pattern of investment
will continue. In debates about whether  to subsidize  agricultural  credit or not, one often
hears that agriculture has wasted so much money in the past that now it can fend for
itself.  Creation of a  policy environment and financial institutions (e.g.,  full price
liberalization, demonopolization  of marketing, tax reform, and mobilization of rural
savings) that allow agriculture to fend for itself is an essential task of the transition.  It
is not enough simply to cut agriculture out of the budget.
Poor  incentives and  relatively low capital stock per  worker  in  the  stylized
economy reduced labor productivity. Severe  price distortions complicate measurement
of labor  productivity  and the contribution  of agriculture  to GNP, but it is likely that labor
productivity  was lower than in industry.  Agricultural  wages were in rough parity with
those of other  sectors. When earnings from private plots were taken into account,
agricultural incomes exceeded those of other workers on average. High wages were- 11  -
sustained  by regular increases  in controlled  purchase  prices for agricultural  products  plus
recurrent loans and grants to farms.8
Yields of grains and field crops were not as high as in Western Europe, where
farmers  receive the support of the Common  Agricultviral  Policy, but they equaled yields
of major commercial  exporters  in other parts of the world. Fertilizer use per hectare  was
lower than in  Western Europe, but higher than in  North America. Use of  other
agricultural  chemicals  was quite low, but poor storage  and management  practices resulted
in  environmental damage and  health problems even at  low  levels of  application.
Technical  productivity  in the livestock  sector was lower than in crops. Lags in breeding
and protein  deficient  feed rations  reduced productivity.  Milk yields per cow lagged  those
of Western Europe by about one third. The -institutional  constraints of collectivized
agriculture hit the livestock sector harder than the crop sector, and it is in livestock
production  that the most substantial  adjustment  will have to take place.
Use of labor, fertilizer, and feed grain was high per unit output, and agricultural
costs of production were high and rising just prior to the beginning of the transition.
With the drastic realignment of exchange rates at the outset of the transition, costs of
production and farm purchase prices no longer look high by comparison with world
ces.  w'iih  iiie increased ability to compare domestic prices to world trading
prices that a reasonable  and unified exchange rate brings, it appears that agricultural
producers are substantially  discriminated  against, since semi-controlled  producer prices
lag world prices.  For example, most Romanian  wheat will be purchased this season  at
$35 per ton at the market and interbank exchange rate of 200 lei to the dollar. (The
official exchange rate is still 60 lei to the dollar.)  Bulgarian producers are locked into- 12 -
a semi-controlled  producer price structure based on seven leva to the dollar, while the
official  and market rate is between eighteen and twenty leva to the dollar. 2
These costs and prices, however, still embody distortions in input prices, since
fertilizer, energy, and machinery  are not yet priced at world trading prices.  Part of the
distress of the early transition is caused by the more rapid approach of input prices to
world levels and slower adjustment  of producer prices.  As the economies  make their
ways in fits and starts to a price structure more consistent  with world trading prices, it
appears that agricultural  incomes will increase less than the general price level.  This is
not necessarily a manifestation  of a textbook  type of urban bias, although some of the
instruments  for restraining  agricultural  earnings, such as Bulgaria's ban on the export of
some food products, are standard tools for the. transfer of income from rural to urban
people. Falling farm incomes now are a symptom  of partial liberalization,  but they also
signal the needed longer term adjustment; more efficient production of products for
which domestic and foreign demand exists under the new price structure.
Agroindustry was highly concentrated, and food processing, distribution, and
input supply were managed by several large state monopolies. With pervasive excess
demand for  food,  processors paid little regard for product definition and quality.
Moreover,  processing  technology  was outdated  and technoiogicai  consiraini  rcducW  'Lie
efficiency and quality of processing. Since retail prices were controlled at low levels,
investment  in better processing  equipment  could not be recovered  on a commercial  basis,
and modernization  of food processing was dependent on direct budgetary allocations.
With the fiscal burden of the direct food subsidy rising, the agricultural sector did not
2  This paper reports on events up to June, 1991. Excharnge  rates and price policy are volatile.- 13 -
compete  successfully  for additional  budgetary  funds to modernize  processing.  Moreover,
food processing was considered  light industry, and as such was not given high priority.
The processing  and retailing  infrastructure  inherited  from the past is very primitive. The
former long lines in meat stores were due only in part to excess demand at subsidized
prices.  Part of the wait was simply  while the butcher took his axe to a carcass.
The stylized  country  was a middle income  country, with per capita GNP  of about
$6,000 using the purchasing  power parity methodology,  and $2,500 using the exchange
rate methodology.  In recent years the country sustained  aggregate consumption  despite
declining  aggregate growth by borrowing heavily abroad. Agriculture's contribution  to
the growth in net foreign  indebtedness  derived from increased demand for imported  feed
grains, and diversion  of food from export markets  to (subsidized)  domestic  consumption.
Per capita consumption  of food was comparable  to countries with income levels
considerably  higher. Caloric  consumption  was the same  as that in market economies  with
higher levels of  income, and  consumption of  meat exceeded that  in  many more
prosperous market economies.  This consumption  pattern was a result of food subsidies,
particularly for livestock  products. Retail food prices changed little in nominal terms for
several decades, despite  growth in nominal  incomes. Real food prices (at official prices)
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people paid were higher than official prices. Consumers' expectations  about what they
should be able to purchase, however, were formed on the basis of official prices.
The most highly subsidized  food items were meat and dairy products, and official
prices for these products were approximately  half the cost of delivery. Subsidization  of
items with low income elasticities  is often considered to benefit poorer people, but the
most highly subsidized items in the stylized economy were those with high income- 14-
elasticities. The food price subsidy  delivered more benefits to the wealthier  groups who
consumed more of the most highly subsidized products, and fewer benefits to poorer
people.
Each country camouflaged  the growing gap between costs of consumption  and
production  by passing the costs to the state through subsidies,  and increasing  imports or
reducing exports of food.  The increase in consumption of food and other goods that
came with the post-Stalin  thaw was one that the underlying  productive  economies  could
not deliver on a sustained  basis.  The degree of subsidization  varied by country and its
impact  on the macroeconomy  also varied, but in each case the burden of food subsidies
was very high.  Subsidized  sausage for the relatively wealthy cut into budgetary funds
available  for  investment in  education,  health  care,  physical infrastructure,  and
environmental  protection.
ITe  damage done by  the  food subsidies and more general price  distortions
transcended their  very  considerable contribution to  destruction of  macroeconomic
balance. Those who  emphasize  the importance  of "getting  prices right" are often accused
of  a  shallow  understanding of  the  subtle  institutional complexity of  successful
development. Yet in the centrally planned economies  where the institutional  apparatus
shvuld  have  nmuted  the damage done by pILCw  distVIUViIb,  i;Ie U  i.i)uUia  WC1C  bUU
tremendously destructive.  Energy and raw  materials were wasued, depleting non-
renewable resources and degrading the environment.  The wastage was built into the
capital stock, making remedies even more costly.  Distorted consumer prices were
damaging even though quantity controls regulated the flow of consumer goods.  The
official  prices, not implicit  shadow  prices, appear to be the ones that consumers  used in
evaluating  the performance  of the system. Perhaps ordinary citizens were the only ones- is -
who took overvalued  official exchange rates seriously, and then wondered why, if they
were so rich, they lived so poorly?  Quantitative  controls were not adequate to counter
the impact  of price distortions in the real economy.
The distortions  were an economic  component  of a multi-dimensional  disjunction
between what actually was; i.e., what people experienced  with their own lives, and what
was publicly presented; i.e.,  the official line.  The disjunction recurred in politics,
culture, personal life,  and scientific inquiry.  The narrow economic cost of  price
distortions was large.  The costs of the larger distortion, of which cheap energy and
sausage lines were a small part, is even greater.  This larger distortion; the attempt to
override reality and resulting confusion  about what is real, has been the central subject
of the distinctive East/Central European literature, art, film, and music of dissent, and
it remains  an important  component  of the legacy. Economists  are now forced to confront
this distortion  in the less aesthetically  appealing  medium  of enterprise balance sheets and
national  accounts; we do not actually know the worth of a firm or a nation when we have
no instruments  for measurement. Those who emphasize  the importance  of "getting  prices
right" are, within the confines of our admittedly  narrow discipline, simply arguing for
telling the truth.
AGRICULTURE  AND  THE  LARGER  LEGACY:  POLITICS,  ECOLOGY,  AND  GENDER
The Politics of Dysfunctional  Development
That politics and economic growth are  linked is clear,  yet the search for a
formulaic  prescription  for the politics of successful  development  has not gone far (Ruttan,
1991). Casual observation  shows  authoritarian  regimes with rapid economic  growth and
democratically  elected  govemments  with disastrous  economic  programs, plus all possible- 16  -
combinations.  Lack of political democracy did not cause the economic program of
Soviet style central planning to  fail, but once it began to  fail, authoritarianism and
suppression  of dissent delayed the day of reckoning, and hence increased the costs.  A
degree of public transparency  about  economic  policy  and protection  of political  pluralism
and dissent would seem to be necessary  checks  on economic  policy and institutions  gone
wrong.
Rights of expression  and.  political  association  are defended now as basic human
rights. Support for these rights  could be bolstered  by designating  them basic instruments
of economic development, for they are one safeguard against massive waste of world
resources earmarked for development.  If these rights are basic to the development
process, then their protection could be made a condition for receipt of development
assistance from the intemational community.  It would not be appropriate for the
intemational community to mandate a particular form of government, and including
protection of rights of expression and association in the conditionality for assistance
would be far from interference  in domestic politics. The disastrous legacy of East and
Central Europe and the USSR  is not  just a domestic  problem for the people of the region.
When the costs of undoing  economic  damage  are to be shared by the world community,
uic cummIzIiun4iy  defends its best interest by ern,powC1jag,  %i.iULCSe  w;10  au wa-n  of ald
perhaps slow the damage.
Had the rights of expression of rural people been protected,  the sector might
have been spared some  of the more  damaging  campaigns. It would  be naive to argue that
protection of dissent is sufficient to secure good policy.  It can nonetheless be very
important  for those who best know the likely impact of a policy to inform society more
generally of the costs ahead.- 17 -
The Environment
The degree of environmental  damage  in East/Central  Europe and the USSR  is not
fully known, but  it  is  clearly substantial.  To  clean the  air,  soil,  and  water  of
contaminants  would be so costly that it cannot be done.  Emissions  will be reduced by
raising the prices of formerly subsidized pollutants, such as energy and fertilizer, by
using cleaner technology  in  new investments,  and by adding some emissions control to
existing plants.
Many environmental  problems  that affect agriculture  originate outside the sector;
e.g.,  soil contamination  with industrial pollutants, and the impact of airborne particles
on crop yields.  Others originate in  agriculture and affect both the sector and the
economy  more  generally;  overutilization of- water  for  irrigation in  arid  areas,
contamination  of ground water with fertilizer  and animal  wastes, and degradation  of soil
quality by improper rotations  and excessively  heavy machinery. A full assessment  of the
degradation of  agriculture's natural resource base has not yet been undertaken.  It
appears  that anecdotal  reports of compromised  food safety  due to environmental  problems
are exaggerated, but problems in some localities  have been documented.
The ecology of Eastern Europe and the USSR is graphic evidence that market
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the full social cost of environmental  degradation  in the planning  process, since the state
would ultimately have to clean up the residue.  If the state, however, was unable to
impose the full cost of a sausage upon the user, it is not surprising that the costs of
environmental  degradation  were not internalized. Moreover, a centrist state must clean
up the environment  only if citizens  are empowered  to demand that it do so.- 18 -
WQmenl  an  Development
Equal opportunity  for women and non-discrimination  by sex were central to the
official  ideology of the socialist  countries  of East/Central  Europe and the USSR. There
has been some success in remedying  traditional  discrimination  against women and many
failures.  Despite the  official formal commitment to  equal opportunity, structural
characteristics of  central planning made these societies particularly burdensome for
women. The suppression  of private household  based economic activity is a clear case
in point, and one particularly  relevant for agriculture.
The suppression of  the household sector and constraints on direct marketed
activities between households  hit women hardest and put them at a disadvantage  in the
formal labor market.  Many women in poor countries and particularly in rural areas
engage in household  based petty manufacturing  and trade in goods and services.  When
this sector is wiped out by regulations  against private activity, women are forced into
wage work where they earn little return to entrepreneurial  talents.  They must still buy
food, clothing, and household  services, but the costs of these items have been increased
by the  requirement that they originate in  the formal sector and pass through state
monopolies.  Substitutes for  household based child  care are  of  lower quality  for
nmmmrshle.  enct,  nrnd  even with  lnroP qt2tia invsatmant  ;n  A,t  care, the  .elffre  ^f
children declines when women are denied part time work and home based private day
care.  Since traditional family roles change with a lag, if at all,  the high costs that
suppression  of the private household  sector impose on family life fall most on women.
Women's economic  opportunities  are constricted  and their economic  burdens increased
when private activities between households  are banned.- 19-
The wage structure on collective and state farms was highly discriminatory in
practice.  The highest wages were reserved for the "mechanizers," men who drove
machines,  and  the biggci  the  d  ac..hivi .I,  hig1,;  hc,  vave.  \Vm  "rk'ed  alnmost
exclusively  in livestock, manual field work, and clerical positions. Of these, the highest
paying  jobs were in livestock, but the work had long hours incompatible  with caring well
for young children, and was physically  very taxing.
Rural women provided much of the labor for the household  plot, and shared in
the marketing of produce.  Prices they received for food on  the free market were
increased by  subsidies and excess demand for food in the state market.  Women's
activities in private production and sale of food constituted a very primitive level of
entrepreneurship, however, and many activities that had high value added and high
earnings were foreclosed to the household  sector.  The resurgence of the household  as
an economic unit in the countryside  and the demise of the official wage structure for
agricultural work is likely to  have an important and beneficial impact on  economic
opportunities  for women.
A counter concern has been raised by some observers of the early stages of
increased private agriculture in the poorest and most backward parts of the region,
particularly in Soviet Central Asia.  There the fear is that girls will be kept home from
school  in order to work on larger private family holdings, and that women's obligations
to cultivate  larger fields will increase  their already considerable  domestic burdens. This
could in  fact result if collective farms continde to exist and serve. as a conduit for
subsidized wages to underemployed  men so plentifully evident in tea shops throughout
the working day.  The particular problems of Soviet Central Asia, with its extreme- 20 -
resource constraint, high population  density, and unique cultural tradition differ from
those  of the European couniAes.
The Transition
The agricultural sector on the eve of the transition is characterized  by:
(a)  Large inefficient farms with high input use (primarily fertilizer,
labor, and feed)
(b)  High levels of food consumption  relative to market economies  of
comparable  prosperity
(c)  Subsidized  food prices
(d)  Excess demand for food at those prices
(e)  Macroeconomic  imbalance, including budget deficit and foreign
debt
(f)  Pervasive monopoly  in food processing  and distribution
The macroeconomic  imbalance in the stylized country is substantial, and the
transition  is initiated by a program of stabilization  (see Blanchard  et al.,  1990).  Fiscal
outlays  are reduced, the money  supply  tightened,  and the overvalued  currency devalued.
The macroeconomic  stabilization  affects the agricultural sector in several ways.
The food subsidy is the most visible target for significant  fiscal savings. Although food
is not the only subsidized item, it is the largest one that appears directly in the budget.
Moreover, at about five percent of GNP it represents a significant  chunk of the budget
deficik.  Retention  of the food subsidy is inconsistent with macroeconomic  stabilization,
and the subsidy is removed. It is  replaced by  a  program of  partial direct income
compensation.- 21 -
Without  the subsidy, meat prices approximately  double, and food prices rise on
average by 50 percent. Demand for food declines, but the fall in demand is moderated
by the ability of wealthier  consumers  to draw savings out of the monetary overhang  and
maintain  expenditures  on food. All consumers, both rich and poor, spend more on food.
The impact on other consumer goods depends  critically on the magnitude  and form of
compensation. The price increase does not reduce caloric intake on average, but does
induce shifts away from more expensive  foods, particularly meat and cheese.
The  price  liberalization frees  processors with  market  power  to  act  like
monopolists,  and many respond by raising prices to consumers  and pressuring producer
prices. The price increase that accompanies  liberalization  is thus in part due to removal
of subsidies, and in part due to the exercise of market power by those who have it.
The price liberalization  does not raise prices that producers receive. In an open
market economy, devaluation  will raise agricultural  producers' prices, since most food
and fiber is tradeable. The stylized  economy is not fully open yet, and transmission  of
changes in world prices and exchange  rates is weak. Moreover, producer prices in the
past exceeded retail prices by the amount of the subsidy. The increase in retail prices
removes  the wedge that formerly  divided  them from producer prices without appreciably
affecting farm level prices.  In a world of partial price liberalization, the formal freeing
of retail food prices is sometimes  accompanied  by retention of controls at the wholesale
level, as governments try to insure themselves  against too rapid a rise in food prices.
Processors' market power allows them to pass controls back to producers.  This partial
decontrol is very evident and damaging  in Pomania  and Bulgaria, and observers praising
the "liberalization"  of retail prices have failed to check farther back in the food chain.- 22 -
Producers are unable to push the former volume of production through markets
at  lower prices,  since for  products requiring processing,  they cannot bypass the
processing monopolies. Producers are  thus  hostage to  the  pace of  change in  the
processing, marketing, and  distribution of  food and  fiber.  The hope of  a  quick
improvement  in agriculture that will facilitate  change in other sectors is illusory unless
a concerted effort to increase competition and the technological performance of food
processing  and marketing  brings early results.
Excess supply appears at the farm level. Some of this can be exported, and it is
more competitive  than in the past due to the devaluation. Institutional  linkage between
producers and international markets, however, is weak, and product definitions and
quality are not conducive to quick switching  between domestic and export markets.
Producers face higher costs for fertilizer and imported animal feed, and the combination
of higher costs and reduced demand puts pressure on farm income.
The crucial variables in determining the impact of macroeconomic  stabilization
on the agricultural sector are the relative magnitude  of the food subsidy, the amount of
excess  demand for food  ante-liberalization,  and the degree of concentration  in processing.
If the food subsidy is small, if its removal approximately  absorbs excess demand, and
if processors have limited market power, the adjustment  process will be less disruptive
for producers. If, however, the shock to the demand side is large and the economy  shifts
abruptly from excess demand to  excess supply, producers will face a  substantial
adjustment.
Problems in food processing  are apparent even prior to the transition, and many
participants  in the food economy  have argued for increased investment  to modernize  food
processing. The investment  is sought both from domestic  and extemal sources, and the- 23  -
goal of the investment is usually construction  of new plants and/or purchase of more
modem equipment. A visitor assessing  the "needs" of food processors of East/Central
Europe can amass requests amounting  to several billion dollars in a few weeks in the
field.
Few of these, when viewed  as commercial  investments  rather than "basic needs,"
pass careful scrutiny.  Unless price liberalization  is well underway and changes in food
demand are better understood, new investment  in food processing  is likely to respond to
the wrong signals. It will be devoted to the wrong commodities,  placed in the wrong
locations, and purchase technology  inappropriate  for the post-transition  factor costs.
Some kinds of  food processing stand out  as  particularly poor  targets  for
investment  in the early period.  Plants that operate wholly or in part with imported raw
materials but sell their products on the domestic market, such as oilseed crushers, will
be particularly hard hit as foreign exchange risk is passed to them but domestic prices
lag world prices.  Meat processors and dairy plants in areas dependent on subsidized
imported feed  are poor targets. Investment  in simple  packaging  technology  and materials
for products with export markets can be relatively safe and productive.  The focus of
change in food processing  in the early period of the transition  should be deconcentration
of existing plan:s, and introduction of comp..'toii  u.-gh  puu  of  ^zia;  -caic
private transport and other means. New investment should promote competition  rather
than simply expand  or modernize  processing  capacity. After the price liberalization  has
settled down alternative investments  in food processing  will be easier to assess.
If producers have  poor access to markets  because  reorganization  of processing  and
distribution  is stalled, they will demand direct government  subsidies to forestal declines
in farm income. Governments will be pressured to embark upon programs of price- 24 -
support that they can ill afford. Tariffs are costless to the budget, but have obvious
implications  for inflation. Moreover, if producers' difficulties stem in part from lack of
domestic competition in processing and marketing, tariffs will not address the basic
problem, and may worsen it.  Poland, which has led in many aspects of the economic
transition,  issued  agricultural  tariffs in May, 1991, designed  to protect the troubled dairy
industry.
Given the inherited concentration in food processing, a concerted demand for
tariff protection  against imported food is a predictable feature of the political economy
of  agriculture during the  transition.  Producers may be  drawn into alliance with
processors when their longer term interests are  not  well served  by  protection of
processors' monopolies.
Producers throughout  the region are calling for subsidized  interest rates, and the
domestic  politics are such that they will probably get them.  An economic  argument can
even be made in favor of subsidized  interest rates for agriculture, (i.e., lower than the
current nominal market rates of 33-50 percent and higher) since as  the price level
stabilizes, long term rates will come down, and a subsidy now may simply embody
confidence  that the stabilization  will succeed. The dangers of subsidized  rates are also
clear and very high.  Interest rate subsidies lead to credit rationing (Braverman and
Guascii, 1991).  Those best armed to compete for rationed credit are the economically
strong cooperatives, especially those of the new type.  Even under the more stringent
calculus of credit risk in which bank staff members are now being trained by foreign
advisors, the new "private" producers' cooperatives will look better than genuinely
private producers, who have had to leave most of their potential collateral with the
cooperative.  Subsidized interest rates will make capital intensive production practices- 25 -
and capital intensive products, such as livestock, more attractive, when in fact they
should  be less attractive. With subsidized  credit, it is likely that investment  will go into
more large machines  and large buildings  <r  large farms under ambiguous  and transitory
collective  ownership.
Without subsidized interest rates, agricultural producers will take little credit.
Distress slaughtering of livestock may exacerbate excess supply of meat.  Those who
might want to go private will be discouraged  by lack of working capital  and money  for
purchase of draft power.
If governments choose to venture into the questionable  business of subsidizing
agricultural credit, attempts should be made to target the subsidies to  "the emerging
private sector."  Cooperatives should not be- granted credit to perpetuate collective
production.  If they borrow to invest in agricultural services or marketing, the loan
should be contingent upon reorganization of  farm accounts to  stop internal cross-
subsidization  of activities  that result in noncompetitive  pricing.  Credit could be tied to
purchase of machinery  of little use to larger cooperatives. Small private  producers want
to purchase very small scale equipment  appropriate for plots of two and three hectares,
such as garden tractors, and cooperatives would have little interest in this equipment.
LrMning  to  cOOPE.Ctlves  for purchase of larger machinery, such as  45  horsepower
tractors, should be contingent on their creation of a separate private firm for sale of
custom machinery services to all customers.
This argument is motivated not by ideological  antipathy to cooperatives, but by
the imperative that the inevitable continued existence of cooperatives not strangle the
private sector.  An anecdote from a Bulgarian village illustrates the potential  danger of
lending  to cooperatives  without  these  precautions. Four private owners of 45 horsepower- 26 -
tractors were trying to sell services to households,  most of whom were still members  of
the cooperative.  The private tractor owners priced their services to meet the costs of
purchase and maintenance  of the tractors, anu furthermore asked customers to provide
the fuel.  The cooperative  offered services  to members  at a much lower rate and did not
charge for fuel.  The private drivers could not compete with the cooperative, and their
tractors were underutilized.  Few members planned to  give up continued access to
subsidized  machinery  services by leaving the cooperative.
An offer to lend to a private custom machinery  unit carved out of the machinery
park of the old cooperative  would force  a revision  of custom  rates, and make more room
both for private tractor drivers and private customers. Moreover, with the recent break
up of artificially amalgamated megacollectives,  most cooperatives are now relatively
small.  If many of them privatized their machinery park, a  competitive industry in
machinery  services would be created quickly. Analogous  arguments can be made about
investment  in marketing  and food processing.
Distribution  of Agricultural  Land
In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, the decision to  restore
rights of  former owners has been universal.  Debate on  the  legal foundation for
r;ffirming  prope.;y  *rghts  in lard proceeded  throughOut  i;.e fi;g  in  1990,  and until
late in the process it was not obvious that restitution  would  be the outcome. Parliaments
passed land laws in Romania  and Bulgaria  in February, 1991, in April in Hungary, and
in May in Czechoslovakia. Each of these laws recognizes  the rights of land owners  just
prior to collectivization.  and sets up a procedure for reinstating the property right.
Since most agricultural land is being returned to people perceived to be rightful
owners,  recipients  do  not  pay,  and  the  land  distribution  has  little  impact  on- 27 -
macroeconomic balances.  In  the  parts of  the  Soviet Union in  which land  was
nationalized  in 1917  and collectivized  between 1929 and 1933, it is difficult to imagine
how rights of former landowners  could be reinstated.  The course of decollectivization
is thus likely to be quite different  in much of the USSR.
The Romanian  land  program  embodies  the  judgment that costs of delay are greater
than those of moving  ahead before all complications  are foreseen and forestalled. Local
land commissions  in each district were established  quickly after passage  of the law. and
began receiving claims.  Households  can claim a maximum of ten hectares, and can
submit a variety of evidence to support their claims.  The period for submission  and
judgment  of claims ended on May 20, at which  date the Land Commissions  were to post
their preliminary  rulings.  --
When possible, claimants will be  given  the  land actually owned prior  to
collectivization. When this is not feasible, a piece of equivalent size and quality will be
retumed.  When the original land was parcelized, the  parcelization is  deliberately
duplicated  in the returned land. Many households  in the Danubian  plain will receive four
or five hectares divided into several parcels.  Holdings in the hill areas will be larger,
and broken into more parcels.
Romanians who reeive  land  inhrough  restitution or  tneir  nights  can  sell  it
immediately  if they so choose, or buy more up to a maximum holding of one hundred
hectares per household. Family members and neighbors have rights of first refusal on
farm  land  for  sale,  and  this  restriction on  free  sale  is  intended to  address  the
fragmentation  problem.  Since in the densely settled areas of intense agriculture almost
all land will be distributed  through  restitution, an active land market  could develop rather
quickly.- 28 -
There appears to be little intent in the law or its implementation  to create farms
of an optimal size, or to look foorward  to how farming will take place after the land is
distributed.  This at first appears economically  myopic, but may in fact show a much
more profound sophistication. The Romanian  approach to the land distribution is more
like a voucher scheme than a land reform, since it widely disperses claims to the land,
but carries little expectation  that people will work the land in the units they receive.  A
small number  of people  receiving  large holdings  (for example, eight to ten hectares)  plan
to manage  them as households. Most people plan to keep most of their land in collective
management  this season and next.  The distribution thus opens a trading period during
which households  can buy and sell their land, consolidate  holdings, and prepare to leave
the collective  when the infrastructure for individual  management  is more developed. In
the meantime the collective  will continue to work the land, and land owners will receive
a share of returns to land proportionate  to their share of the farm's total area.
The IMF/IBRD/OECD/EBRD  joint  mission to  the USSR suggested that the
collective serve in a transitional  period as a vehicle for the trade and consolidation of
members' shares after an initial apportioning.  This role for the collective may be
emerging spontaneously  from the Romanian land distribution.  It is not a consciously
zzs,.UA.`  AUM..,  liowevea, 4a1u thller is  lU lindicaUoruu  t4la.  th;.W  collecUVES  S-CEa  U1",;AVY
as transitory  organizations. It is thus important  that the land distribution  be accompanied
by new regulations  easing procedures by which members  can withdraw and take their
share of non-land assets with them.  It also underscores the importance of restricting
coopeiatives from taking on debt that would complicate  the future exit of members.
People who worked on cooperative  farms in Romania but cannot claim any land
through restitution can claim on the basis of their labor input.  Since even those with- 29 -
prior claims will receive small allotments,  the holdings distributed  purely for labor will
be quite small. People  receiving  land in recognition  of their contribution  of labor cannot
sell their land for ten years.  This is a curious provision, since young  people who chose
to remain on collective farms are probably the least likely of their cohort to be the
universally  despised "speculators," who might acquire and sell an asset purely to make
some money.  The quantity  of land tied up by this restriction is not significant.
The Romanian  approach to the land distribution appears to have broken through
the confusion  about how to start the process. Its progress, and that of the land programs
in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland  will be monitored  in a study  jointly undertaken  by The
World Bank the member countries.
The fragmentation  of very small holdings  implicit  in the Romanian  approach  could
plague agriculture in the future.  Market based solutions to fragmentation  of farm land
in Western Europe after World War It were not adequate to consolidate holdings, and
administrative  consolidation was necessary.  The chance for success in market based
consolidation  is greater in Romania now, since all rights are distributed simultaneously
and many recipients  will be trying to adjust their initial claims before removing the land
from collective management. Special programs to promote purchase, sale, and trade
over the next year could be highly productive in the longer run.  Financing tor land
acquisition may be necessary, and subsidized rates for land consolidation would be
justifiable.  Since the quantities of land traded will be small and  the value of  land
relatively low during the contraction, many buyers will probably choose to pay cash.
The cash may come from urban relatives who hold the  residual of  the  monetary
overhang. People who put spare money  into land are more likely to be relatives than the
feared land speculators.- 30 -
The land law in  Bulgaria was also passed in  February,  1991, but political
stalemate and administrative  inertia delayed its implementation.  The National Land
Council, the main administrative  organ of implementation,  was not appointed until May
31, 1991, and appointment  of local land commissions  was attendant upon the formation
of the national  commission. As a consequence,  people who wanted  to claim land in the
first half of 1991 had nowhere to take their claims.  Many of the records showing who
brought land into the collectives  are held by the farms, and even managers who wanted
to  speed the  restitution of  land rights could not  submit them to  nonexistent local
commissions. Some land has been returned under temporary use rights, but transfer of
title is much delayed.
Administrative  delay has slowed the implementation  of the Bulgarian law.  The
philosophy  of land distribution  embodied in the law and the implementing  regulations  is
by nature a slow one.  Rather than relying on market trades to improve a quick and
imperfect distribution of  rights,  the  Bulgarian approach  attempts construction of
appropriate  holdings  through administrative  assignment. Local land commissions  accept
and adjudicate  claims, and when a substantial  number of claims have been verified, turn
them over to a team of specialists  who draw up a local map of the allocated holdings.
ThS approachI1  is deemed niecessary  for several reasons.  ine  iuiganans  want to
avoid parcelization,  and doubt the efficacy  of market based  consolidation. Market based
solutions  are indeed unlikely to work, since the law prohibits purchase and sale of land
by private individuals for three years.  In many places the amount of land that can be
restored  is only a proportion  of that  claimed, since development  has changed the contours
and use of land, and agricultural area has declined.  In these areas all claims will be
prorated by the necessary proportionate  adjustment.  The effort to achieve justice and- 31 -
economic efficiency through administrative  meticulousness  can be contrasted with the
Romanian  priority on speed.  The costs and benefits of each approach are not yet clear.
It is certain, however, that the Bulgarian distribution  is much delayed, and six months
after passage of the law, not yet ready to move into high gear.
In Hungary, the initial attempt to return agricultural  land to prior owners  in 1990
was struck down by the Constitutional  Court, with the ruling that restitution  of ownership
of agricultural  land must be considered along with that of other assets.  In April, 1991,
land owners, along with dispossessed  owners of other property, were granted vouchers
redeemable  for agricultural  land or other assets. Landowners  who continued  to hold title
to lands managed by the cooperative are granted the return of their managerial rights
unconditionally.  In Hungary, thus, the restitution for those who relinquished title is
essentially monetary, and the impact on demand for land depends on economic agents'
assessment  of the value of land compared  to other assets. Many who use their vouchers
to buy land are likely to take a consolidated holding and rermove  it from collective
management. Others with a speculative  demand for land may buy it with vouchers, but
rent the land to collectives  or other individuals. Those who resume use rights over land
they always owned are more likely  to have fragmented  pieces, and may keep the land in
collective management longer.  The  new Hungarian law  has  not  yet  passed the
Constitutional  Court.
In Czechoslovakia,  the law mandating  return of agricultural land to prior owners
who will cultivate it passed only in late May, 1991, and at the time of passage, little
interest in claiming land was reported.  In Czechoslovakia  the agricultural sector is a
relatively small part of the national  economy, due largely to the industrial development
of the Czech republic and its dominance  in the aggregate measures. Agriculture  is more- 32 -
important in Slovakia.  Food markets approximately cleared even prior to the price
liberalization, and few citizens of the country perceive that they have had or now have
a  "food problem."  Thus the need to change the  inherited structure of agricultural
production has  been late  in  coming, although a  fully  open  trade  regime  would
demonstrate  its high cost relative to world levels.
The agricultural  contraction  is just beginning  in Czechoslovakia,  and difficulties
marketing meat and milk are pulling farm incomes down.  Pressure for change is
increasing,  but it is early yet to predict whether the form of change will be protection  of
the old structure, or the start of decollect.vization. Since the agricultural sector is a
smaller share of the Czechoslovak  economy, and given the complications of  federal
politics, pressures for protection  and subsidy will be great.
In Poland, the state sector owns only about 20 percent of agricultural  land, since
the  remainder of  land was never collectivized, and  remains in  fragmented private
ownership  by smallholders. Although  the proportion of marketed output that originated
in the state sector was greater than its share of land ownership, the excess supply of food
occasioned  by the Polish big bang diminished  the perceived urgency to reorganize state
farms.  Those most agitated abou. the fate of state farms were their employees, who
favored traisfer  of land and assets to the workfore.  ,,e  dispositiornof  land  In  Polishi
state farms has thus been deferred.  In general, throughout the region, decisions with
regard to state farms have lagged reorganization  of the collective sector.
In summary, the land distribution  programs in practice are quite diverse, and are
not what most people outside the region expected.  In surveying the economic options,
few outside economists  would have chosen physical restitution  of rights of prior owners
as the preferred solution  (see Vickers  and Yarrow, 1990). The economic  difficulties are- 33 -
evident.  Moral issues seldom raised are also relevant: what about the rights of people
killed or dispossessed  prior to 1946  or 1948  or the date that serves the interests of those
now represented politically?  These issues have been raised,  but not resolved, in
Hungary, and have not figured importantly  in debate in the other countries.
It is not surprising, given the reorganization  and turmoil that  has characterized  the
agricultural  sectors of the region, that the paper trail of prior property rights has in some
areas been lost.  The more unexpected  fact is how well preserved it is in many places,
testifying  again to the political inevitability  of restitution.  The emergence of yellowed
but carefully preserved  land titles, tax documents,  and registries  of property brougnt into
the collective  farm suggests  an enduring  conviction  that  these documents  woulc some day
be important. An elderly Romanian  peasant viewing, in early May, 1991, a draft copy
of the new land title looked at it carefully,  paused, and commented, "Yes, I have one of
those from my father.  You should give it a bit more color."
The restitution approach has an economic  advantage to complement  its apparent
political appeal, and counter some of the economic problems  it raises.  Had land been
distributed  without  payment to the agricultural work force with no higher principle than
"land to  the tiller,"  it would have been easy to  exclude rural people from further
dis'ib-UU,I  of  s .e1WC  o-w-ned  assets,  ln  ile grounus LhaL  they aiready received tneir  fair
share.  Since landowners  have instead received back property that was rightly theirs all
along, there can be little justification for excluding rural people from a share of assets
accumulated by  the state.  Thus, when privatization swings into full force through
vouchers or  distributed shares, rural people will be integrated into the new capital
markets.- 34 -
Price Liberalization
The speed and apparent success  of liberalization  of retail food prices is surprising
and poorly recognized.  Even a year ago the liberalization of retail food prices was
considered a political mine field.  Governments  entered it with great trepidation and
varying degrees of caution.  All (except Albania and the USSR) are now either in the
midst of the process or essentially  through it.  Curiously, no one has noted that nothing
exploded.
The success of the food price liberalization  is in part because it came first.  To
that ambiguous honor, plus the fact that the liberalization  is in general partial, can be
attributed many problems, but the problems must be viewed in light of the original
pessimism that food prices could never be changed without  social explosion.
In a world of partial price liberalization  with immature markets, many products
are sold at essentially  world prices, while  others are little changed from the days of high
Stalinism.  In the early and haphazard  privatization  of state retail stores, the newly private
space goes to high margin retailers, primarily in high quality clothing, electronics, and
imported  toys, food, and miscellany. By accident rather than design these outlets appeal
to a very important  political  constituency,  urban  young  adults, the East/Cental European
yuPPiC3.  TLhese  peupie nave sought our imported goods ror years, and tVe greater
opportunities to do so now in open legal transactions bring an increase in perceived
welfare greater than this sector's miniscule  impact on aggregate  indicators.
Although more high quality products are now available at world prices, many
domestic products are  still sold at  low prices even if prices are  no longer strictly
controlled.  For example, one can buy Barbie dolls in the import shops of Bucharest  at- 35 -
world prices at the market exchange  rate, but decent quality domestic  records of classical
and folk music cost ten cents each.
No economist  designing  a clean transition would write in price distortions  of the
kind that are appearing now.  They decapitalize state enterprises slow to adjust their
prices.  For industries that will not survive the transition, it is perhaps justifiable to
distribute  assets generally  to consumers, rather than encouraging workers to cannibalize
the enterprise through wage increases.  For enterprises that will survive and will be
restructured by new owners, the depreciation  of assets through delayed  price adjustment
is more damaging.
Despite  the longer term costs of these price distortions  peculiar to the early stage
of the transition, they explain in part why food price liberalization did not elicit the
feared  reaction. The distortions  are also an essential  ingredient  in understanding  changes
in  agriculture early in the transition.  Retail food prices have been among the first
liberalized  at the consu.ner level.  With other prices adjusting more slowly, the relative
rise in food prices is even greater in the short run than it will be over a longer horizon.
Since the food processing and retailing industries are not yet privatized and a
number of distortions  remain throughout, it would be erroneous to argue that retail food
pfics  ase frI  market prices.  Prices are free to fluctuate, however,  and  governments
are paying  little if anything  in direct food subsidy. Few observers would have predicted
ex Afte that Lhis  could have been done in a short time without triggering widespread
protest.
The success of the price liberalization  is all the more remarkable in that it was
done in the virtual absence of any safety net to cushion the impact of much higher
relative prices for food.  Citizens were granted partial monetary compensation, but- 36 -
targeted programs of direct food relief were not attempted anywhere.  A small number
of old people, handicapped,  and generally  desperate  types begging  on the streets of major
cities show that an explicit food safety net is needed in East/Central Europe, just as it is
in more prosperous market economies.
In the wealthier  northern countries  of Poland, Cze-hoslovakia,  and Hungary, full
liberalization of  food  prices  without  targeted  assistance appears  to  have  been
accomplished;  generalized  compensation  was adequate and prices are now largely free.
In Romania and Bulgaria, where consumer incomes are lower but fully free prices will
be approximately  at world levels, the liberalization  that has taken place is incomplete  at
this writing in June,  1991.  Consumers absorbed a large increase when the explicit
subsidy was removed, and were compensated through partial adjustment of  wages.
Governments  with shaky political  mandates,  however, were unable  to risk freeing prices
to world levels, and retained administrative  pressures  on wholesale  prices.  Wholesalers
and processors pushed the controls back to the producer level.
In the southern countries, thus, the contraction is greater and distress at the
producer level is more extreme than in the northern countries where price liberalization
has been more complete.  Future policy in Romania and Bulgaria will have to include
1LUL1.1  fIcciurg  of  whUlesale  anid producer picies, duLu  i  dilUUUoiU'  uf  i cost effective
targeted assistance for needy consumers.  The Romanian and Bulgarian experience is
likely to  be replicated in  the USSR unless the lessons of  partial liberalization on
agricultural production can be demonstrated.
The actual course of liberalized food prices is difficult to trace because of the
general weakness in statistics now.  Both the record and the course of liberalization  in
Czechoslovakia  seems most straightforward. Food prices were raised administratively- 37 -
in July,  1990, by 26 percent on average to remove the direct  budgetary subsidy.  Prices
were controlled at the new higher levels, and consumers received partial compensation.
In January,  1991, prices  were  liberalized,  and jumped  quickly  by about  30  percent,
before  levelling  off  in  March  and  starting  to  decline  in  response  to  excess  supply,
particularly  of beef.
These  price  increases,  although large  by  world  standards,  are  modest in  the
East/Central European current context.  Moreover, the larger Czechoslovak incomes and
smaller share of food in family budgets eased the absorption of the shock.  In Romania,
in contrast,  with partial  price liberalization  that pressures  producer  prices  of grain  to
approximately half of world levels, the consumer price index for food is reported to have
risen in April, 1991 to 255 compared to 100 in.  October, 1990 (Buletin Statistic  de Pretun,
Nr.  5, April  1991, Bucharest,  Romania).
Consumers'  adjustments in Romania and Bulgaria have been both admirable and
painful,  and  more  adjustment  lies  ahead.  The  puzzle  of  declining  production  and
continued lines and "shortage" when prices are in theory free and have doubled in a short
time is explained by the considerable degree of control  that remains  behind the retail
level.
Conclusion
The agricultural  transition is an essential part of stabilization and adjustment  in
East/Central  Europe because agncultural  sectors are large  aid  food is important.  The
transition is not the story-book variety; agricultural producers  cannot spin collectivized
straw into market oriented gold and deliver it in the morning to the Minister of Finance.
Like the miller's  daughter, however,  producers and their domestic and foreign advisors
must name  the thing they face before  they have any  power  over  it.  An agricultural- 38 -
transition  when demand is constrained  is more difficult to manage  than one in which the
fruits of institutional change and productivity growth find ready outlets.  Moreover,
although  price movements  are not yet clear, it appears that removal  of subsidies  on feed
credit, fertilizer, machinery, and energy will move terms of trade against agriculture,
particularly against the large livestock sector.  The  need for productivity  increase will
thus be even greater than in the past.  Productivity  growth will be difficult to achieve  if
demand  is constrained. Any  progress on the demand  side, through  expansion  of domestic
demand  or improved  performance  in export markets, will therefore give a major impetus
to the institutional  changes needed on the supply side.
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Per Capita Average Food Consumption, 1985
Kilograms Annually
1984-86 
Crain Calorie  Vegetable  und Country  Per Day  Meat  Milk '  Oil v  Sugar  Bread
USA  3.642  118  129  11  30  5 Japan  2.858  38  36  12  21  1)8 Austria  3.416  90  142  15  37  68 Finland  3.080  68  182  6  37  73 France  3.273  106  84  12  34  30 FR Germany  3.476  100  112  5  37  '4 Ireland  3.692  97  289  1i  41  '2 Norway  3.219  51  203  n.a  38  I Portugal  3.134  52  43  12  29  11)6 Spain  3.365  75  102  25  33  -7 United kingdom  3.218  74  41  12  37  I;3
Bulgaria  3,634  77  250  16  35  1444 Czechoslovakia  3,473  86  239  8  35  111 GDR  3,800  96  - 2  40  99 Hungary  3,541  77  175  5  35  110 Poland  3,298  67  403  3  41  118 Romania  3,358  60  - n.a  26  143 USSR  3,394  62  295  10  42  133
Source:  FAO Production  1987,  pp. 291, 193.  Food and  Agrici  Iture  Organization  of the United  Nations, 1988.
Food Consumotion  Statistics  197iL-LS,  OECD,  Paris, I  l88.
COMECON  Data 19U8.  Wener .ntitute far Inematio msle  Wiruschatkvergeiche,  1989,  pp. 157-163.
a/  For OECD  countries,  excludas  processed  dairy products.  For  CMEA  countries,  includes  milk equivalent of all dairy  products. b/  For OECD  countries,  excildist  nmrari.  For CMEA,  includes  al vegetable  oil and  derivative  prducts. c/  Excludes  other  sweteners,  aund  syrups.- 40 -
1985-88 Average Yields: (MT/IIA,  MT/COW)
Country  Barley  Milk  Rye  Sugar  Beet  Wheat
Bulgaria  3.544  3.386  10.473  17.636  3.638
Czechoslovakia  4.336  3.843  18.942  35.854  4.936
GDR  4.700  4.312  25.241  31.196  5.282
Hungary  3.866  4.803  18.221  37.435  4.765
Poland  3.252  3.098  18.555  33.632  3.584
Romania  *  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Soviet Union  1.700  2.395  11.799  25.029  1.747
Yugoslavia  2.611  1.750  8.294  38.813  3.726
Austria  4.289  3.804  27.954  54.471  4.780
Canada  2.722  5.444  25.8u3  39.027  1.782
Denmark  4.911  4.793  35.339  50.824  6.293
France  5.104  3.603  34.187  61.123  5.790
Greece  2.296  1.890  17.465  61.320  2.387
USA  2.596  6.159  33.020  46.539  2.415
Source: FAO  Production  Yearbook,  1989.
*  Revised  Romanian  data  for 198'  -88  are not  yet available.PRE  Workina  Paper  Series
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